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Security policy has traditionally focused on the threat of deliber-
ate aggression with a clarity and emotional intensity that presumably derives
from the far recesses of time. For most of history, it was appropriate to be
primarily concerned with intentional aggression since the destruction hu-
man beings could inflict on one another had to be consciously organized if it
was to occur on a major scale. It is increasingly evident, however, that ad-
vanced technology and the sheer magnitude of human activity are generat-
ing a different form of threat. Today, an unanticipated chain of spontaneous
effects might rival or exceed the destructiveness of intentional war. This sort
of accidental war might erupt, ironically, from the military operations de-
signed to protect against the risk of classic aggression itself.
The danger of accidental war was demonstrated in World War I and was
recognized in its aftermath. The experience of World War II, however, ob-
scured the lesson and powerfully reinforced the traditional concern of inten-
tional aggression. Over the ensuing decades, as the instruments of warfare
acquired capacities for rapid and massive destruction, the military forces
that wielded them were configured to deter or to defeat deliberate attack.
Precautions were taken to assure that their enormously destructive power
would not be employed without legitimate authorization, but those precau-
tions were clearly subordinated to the purpose of deterrence. That effect
was achieved and is plausibly credited with preventing at least the largest
forms of deliberate aggression, but the accomplishment has enabled a mas-
sive accident to occur. Overwhelming deterrence entails some inherent risk
of inadvertent catastrophe.
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The political consciousness of the Cold War that inspired the commit-
ment to overwhelming deterrence is distant history, but its major legacy has
survived essentially intact and largely uncontested. The main protago-
nists—the United States and Russia—are now attempting to work out an
amicable relationship, but each still maintains thousands of nuclear weap-
ons continuously prepared to initiate a massive assault on the other within a
few minutes. The destructive capacity of these forces poses the greatest
physical threat to both societies and to the rest of the world. In the absence
of an ideological quarrel, however, there is
such abiding faith in deterrence that the
risk of potential destruction is accepted as
assuring protection rather than as present-
ing an imminent danger. There has been no
serious attempt to terminate mass deterrent
operations. Even reducing forces to levels
that have been provisionally agreed upon
will not remove the ability to inflict damage
far beyond any historical experience.
By contrast, the arms control process de-
signed to contain the capacity for destruc-
tion has been subjected to a barrage of querulous objection. The Russian
Duma has not ratified the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START
II), even though the ceilings it imposes are substantially higher than the de-
ployment level Russia is likely to be able to sustain over the long term. The
U.S. Senate has voted against ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) even though it would lock in a large technical advantage for
the United States and is considered by much of the world to be an estab-
lished obligation essential for the prevention of proliferation. In both in-
stances, it appears overwhelmingly obvious that the two countries are far
better off with the spurned treaties than without them, but vigorous argu-
ments to the contrary have been advanced as an apparent extension of do-
mestic politics.
In the case of the CTBT, U.S. opponents claimed that the treaty could
not be verified. The range of plausible uncertainty, however, is well below
the minimum explosive yield for any test that could be expected to produce
useful weapons-design information.1  Similarly, opponents argued that the
reliability of the U.S. weapons stockpile could not be assured over the longer
term, even though all nonnuclear components of the weapons could and
would be tested under the terms of the treaty. Any suspected problem with
the fissionable material could be resolved by remanufacturing them to their
original specifications.2  The fact that central provisions of legal restraint
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can be held hostage to such arguments advanced at the extreme edge of ra-
tional judgment is a symptom of pathology in the arms control process.
Although it is difficult to determine at this point just how serious the ap-
parent pathology might be, it is certainly prudent to be concerned. It is un-
likely that ratification of START II or of the CTBT will be accomplished
before new presidents take office in Russia and the United States. Mean-
while zealous advocates of national missile defense in the United States can
be expected to stage an assault on the ABM Treaty, which they would like to
declare obsolete, and there is a substantial chance that the effort will suc-
ceed. The Clinton administration has promised to make a specific deploy-
ment decision in July 2000. It has proposed amendments to the treaty that
would legalize the limited deployment immediately intended, but Russia has
stated quite firmly that it will not accept those amendments or any variation
that would validate the U.S. program. If the United States proceeds with a
deployment effort in admitted violation of the treaty, as it has threatened to
do, then the Russians have promised to declare all offensive force limita-
tions invalid and might choose to violate agreed restrictions on multiple
warhead deployments. At that point, with India and Pakistan on the verge
of overtly deploying nuclear weapons, a reverberating series of potential re-
actions could conceivably shatter the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and collapse the entire framework of legal restraint on nuclear weap-
ons deployment.
Since the basic principle of legal restraint is widely considered to be in-
dispensable, the acknowledged failure of major treaties would presumably
generate a protective political reaction. It is questionable, however, whether
the existing agreements could be restored once they had been violated by
authorized deployment programs. It is even more questionable whether they
could be replaced through the tedious and largely unproductive process of
adversarial negotiation that has prevailed over the past decade. In fact, the
current arms control regime is likely to require major renovation, respond-
ing to dramatically changed circumstances, regardless of whether there is an
acute crisis over U.S. national missile defense.
The Argument for Renovation
In considering what a major renovation might attempt to do, it is natural to
begin by rehearsing the familiar characteristics of the existing arrangements
and the basic reasons why they developed as they did. The principal legal
restrictions on nuclear weapons deployments evolved through bilateral ne-
gotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The central
agreements were formulated to impose, first, ceilings and, then, a schedule
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of reductions on the deployment of delivery vehicles capable of carrying
nuclear weapons over relatively long ranges. The intent was to distinguish a
strategic level of threat, where the common interest in mutual restraint was
judged to be stronger, from other, more localized forms of military engage-
ment considered to be more contentious. The focus of control on delivery
vehicles was chosen since they were more easily verifiable by remote means
of observation. The underlying presumption was that the two countries
would continue to be hostile adversaries. The basic purpose of establishing
formal agreements was to regulate the balance of opposing capability in or-
der to render it less burdensome and less dangerous to both sides.
From the outset, both governments and military establishments under-
stood that the agreements would protect the deterrent capacities of both
parties. Offensive and defensive forces would be regulated in relation to
each other. Similarly, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, a multilateral docu-
ment imposing comprehensive restrictions on nuclear weapons testing, and
the NPT, imposing selective restrictions on the development of nuclear
weapons by other military establishments, were understood to be supple-
mental to the bilateral treaties and contingent upon their further develop-
ment. Although segmented into separate legal documents, the overall
arrangement has been, in effect, a global bargain to regulate use of the
world’s most destructive technology. Without these agreements, the 44
countries that operate nuclear reactors today could theoretically deploy
nuclear weapons. All these agreements are intertwined and the underlying
logic is a simple and virtually inevitable rule: if anyone is to be constrained
in the application of this technology, then everyone must be.
The surrounding circumstances have changed substantially, of course,
since the original arms-control treaties were formulated. Quite apart from
questions of ideology and political intention, Russia is not, and is never
likely to be, a replacement for the Soviet Union as the balancing correspon-
dent to the United States in the core bilateral arrangement. Russia does not
have the economic capacity to assume that role and cannot plausibly de-
velop it anytime soon. Moreover, Russia has fundamentally different strate-
gic imperatives. The society is undergoing extensive internal regeneration,
the urgent purpose of which is to connect productively to the globalizing in-
ternational economy. Its considerable importance to the outside world is
contingent upon the outcome of that regeneration. The fate of its military
establishment is also entangled in that process, but the central question is
not the capacity for strategic bombardment, but rather its internal manage-
rial coherence.
Russia must exercise responsible control over what is believed to be the
largest nuclear-weapons inventory. It must also preserve the basic elements
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of civil order on its own territory. The ability of a beleaguered government
caught up in internal transformation to do these things cannot be presumed.
What can be presumed is that Russia will need substantial reassurance if it is
to manage its inherited nuclear arsenal safely. That reassurance will have to
be extended to all the legitimate missions its military is responsible for per-
forming, not merely those considered strategic by the outside world.
Although the internal transformation of Russia is proving to be especially
difficult, the international security implications are not unique. With the
military predominance of the U. S. alliance system now arguably the greatest
in history, all countries outside of that system
suffer a corresponding disadvantage. Hege-
monic power often imagined in popular rheto-
ric does not automatically come with that
military strength, but military preponderance
does create issues of inequity. For those coun-
tries concerned about a potential military
confrontation with the U.S. alliance system
for reasons not necessarily under their con-
trol, this is a major security problem. Since it
is not feasible for any country or group of countries to match the military ca-
pacity of the U.S. alliance system for the foreseeable future, there is a strong
incentive to pursue asymmetrical deterrent strategies. In other words, these
countries are being driven to identify vulnerable hostages they could
threaten in order to fend off intimidation. If advanced technologies are
adapted for that purpose and critical assets targeted, the resulting arrange-
ment would be very dangerous indeed. The priority for the United States
and acknowledged friends is to reassure the disadvantaged to prevent these
asymmetrical deterrent strategies. The central purpose of arms control in
the new situation, then, is not to deter but to reassure. Deterrence has be-
come too large and too inequitably distributed for its own good.
As the word implies, a renovation of this sort would not eliminate but
rather reconfigure the existing international security structure. So, presum-
ably, nuclear weapons would continue to be deployed for an indefinite pe-
riod and would exercise their inherent deterrent effect. Limitations on
deployed numbers and on development testing would be preserved, a sched-
ule of judicious reductions would be set, and proliferation controls would be
maintained. The main emphasis would shift, however, from restrictions on
the number of deployed weapons to restrictions on their operational prac-
tices. Because adequate deterrence is more easily achieved in today’s inter-
national security environment, formal agreements would be designed to
maximize reassurance by establishing high standards of operational safety.
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The purpose would be to prevent accidental, unauthorized, or inadvertent
use of the deployed weapons more reliably.
In advanced form, such an arrangement would remove all weapons from
an alert status in which they are immediately available for use, and would
verify that condition by collaborative monitoring techniques that could not
be bypassed, blinded, or fooled. Official doctrines of nuclear weapons use
would be restricted by legal agreement exclusively to “no-first-use,” meaning
retaliation only against attack by another nuclear weapon and only then in
proportion to the original attack itself. Corresponding restrictions would be
imposed on the first use of conventional weapons as well in order to regulate
their use for purposes of retribution as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan re-
cently. It is not only the imposing nuclear deterrent of the United States
that creates a need for reassurance, but its increasingly intrusive and inher-
ently more usable capacity for precise conventional attack as well.
Admittedly these provisions would be a major extension of existing arms
control arrangements and would probably incite even more vehement objec-
tion from the traditional critics. Since they respond more directly to the
emerging problems of international security, however, that greater relevance
might generate more robust support from others. At any rate, the stark im-
balance in capacity that has developed today will assuredly not be accepted
as equitable, and the implications of inequity are likely to be relentless.
Exploratory Applications
The arms control regime does not have a reigning architect in the sense that
a building does. As a matter of practical politics, it is unlikely that anyone
who would want to redesign arms control based on the principle of reassur-
ance would ever be granted the authority to do so. Major adjustments of
that sort usually occur in a series of seemingly incremental steps, with a shift
in organizing principle recognized only after the fact. The fate of legal re-
straint will predictably turn on specific issues, the most important and im-
mediate instance being the impending collision of policy over the U.S.
national missile defense (NMD) program. As with any incipient crisis, that
situation offers opportunity as well as danger; the practical question is how
the opportunity might be used to begin to apply the principles of renovation.
The tendency to gloss over, or obfuscate, disagreements is the first prob-
lem that should be addressed. Despite rising nationalist resentment on the
Russian side—a reaction that a truly objective observer presumably would
find understandable under the circumstances—the two governments are
clearly not eager for a full-blown confrontation on the NMD issue. They will
probably strain to put an accommodating spin on whatever decisions they
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make. On the whole, of course, that reflects a constructive attitude neces-
sary for any desirable outcome, but it makes it difficult to bring the sharp
contradiction in underlying policy into focus.
The hard fact is that Russia cannot responsibly accept the current U.S.
position. The limited NMD deployment being projected would establish the
foundation for a much more extensive and more capable system over time.
Since relative offensive capabilities can be expected to diverge under even
the most advanced treaty limitations that have
been officially discussed, the net result would
pose an extreme threat to the viability of the
Russian deterrent force. The United States
would gradually acquire a potentially decisive
capacity to destroy the Russian force without
suffering significant retaliation. The United
States has not offered or even seriously con-
templated the drastic offensive force restric-
tions that would be necessary to preclude that development. It will not be
possible to address this problem until it is admitted.
There is a corresponding problem with China that is even less visible.
China has deployed only about 20 ballistic missile launchers that could
reach the United States and does not routinely operate them on alert status.
On any normal day, the United States could destroy those launchers in a
preemptive attack. China, long aware of this, has chosen to tolerate the
risk. The Chinese deterrent force directed against the United States could
have been made larger and more robust long ago if China wanted to. Beijing
has apparently judged the overall risk of a deliberate first strike by the
United States to be less than the risk inherent in the high-alert deployments
long maintained by Russia and the United States. A completely renovated
arms control arrangement based on reassurance would follow that example.
China has warned, however, that it would reconsider its posture if the
United States were to deploy either an NMD or a theater missile defense
(TMD) system designed for broad-area protection in Asia. Because the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is strictly bilateral between the United
States and Russia, China does not have legal standing to raise its concerns.
In real strategic terms, however, Beijing’s concerns are as legitimate as
Moscow’s and comparably important as well, although the specific implica-
tions may be somewhat different. This problem will also not be addressed
until it is acknowledged.
What might be done, then, if both these problems were to be admitted?
A natural first step is to address the surveillance of ballistic missile trajecto-
ries, a major operational problem that links the traditional arms-control
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agenda with a renovated one. Under existing security practices, which are
designed principally to deter, continuous surveillance combined with highly
alert force operations provides a principal method of protection against pre-
emptive destruction. But it also provides a critical element of reassurance
necessary to prevent the practice of deterrence from becoming a self-defeat-
ing provocation to war. By continuously observing the missile trajectories
that the opponent would use to conduct an attack, Russia and the United
States continuously demonstrate to themselves that a major attack is not
immediately underway and that retaliation is not immediately required. It is
vital to the United States that Russia never
make any misjudgment in that regard and
similarly for Russia that the United States
not do so.
Unfortunately, although their interests
are symmetrical, the capacities to prevent a
catastrophic misjudgment are not. The U.S.
surveillance system has comprehensive,
state-of-the-art coverage of possible attack
corridors, which protects Washington from falsely concluding a Russian at-
tack has been launched. The Russian surveillance system, in contrast, has
major gaps in coverage, both in space and in time, and is believed to be slip-
ping in quality. That creates a risk that an attack will be falsely attributed to
the United States.
At a summit meeting in September 1998, Russia and the United States
agreed in principle to establish a joint center for missile surveillance. Imple-
mentation of that initiative is probably the single most effective step that
might immediately be taken both to stabilize the traditional deterrent rela-
tionship and to introduce the broader concept of reassurance. If the United
States provided missile flight information upon which Russia was willing to
rely, it would be a much more advanced form of security collaboration than
any during the Cold War. Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin proposed
this initiative at a time when neither enjoyed commanding political author-
ity, and the idea had not been developed by the U.S. and Russian security
bureaucracies in sufficient detail. Subsequent efforts to implement this idea
were suspended by the Russians in reaction to the Kosovo crisis.
To assure reliance on such a vital matter and to prevent suspicion that
would only compound the problem, Russia would have to be deeply and ir-
reversibly integrated into the U.S. missile-tracking system—so deeply, in
fact, that Russia would have to be treated as nearly a coequal partner. That
would require revising attitudes on both sides to an extent not currently
considered feasible. Nonetheless, if a constructive breakthrough is to occur
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in the shadow of an incipient NMD crisis, then joint missile surveillance is
one of the more prominent possibilities. In principle it could even be ex-
tended to China.
Broader Ideas
For venturesome souls, joint missile surveillance can also be seen as a lead-
ing item on a much broader agenda involving how information would be
gathered and disseminated under a renovated security arrangement. In the
Cold War practice of verification, reassuring information is exchanged un-
der strictly limited and exhaustively negotiated terms designed to demon-
strate compliance with specified agreements. Under the START
agreements, for example, the parties declare their ballistic missile invento-
ries and promise not to interfere beyond specified limits with the national
surveillance systems used to independently observe those inventories.
A renovated arrangement would exchange information more openly, con-
ceivably including daily operational practices, in order to demonstrate not
only legal compliance but much broader intent. Thus, in addition to docu-
menting basic weapons inventories, the parties would assertively seek to
demonstrate the integrity of their managerial control systems and would be-
gin to harmonize and ultimately integrate the operations of those systems. A
common accounting and physical security system would be devised for exer-
cising strict control over fabricated warheads and fissionable materials, and
discussion of joint operation would begin. More accurate accounting than is
currently possible under traditional rules of verification will be required to
reduce active deployment to levels ranging in the hundreds of weapons.
Joint operation of the system would probably be necessary to establish high-
quality reassurance about the state of nuclear weapons inventories.
In anticipation of that eventual requirement, all of the nuclear weapons
states should be involved in the design of such an arrangement. As yet,
however, such a system does not appear to have been seriously discussed in
bilateral terms, let alone as the multilateral arrangement it would ultimately
have to be. Since it is likely to take several decades to develop such a system
with high standards of accuracy and protection, it is important to begin the
design immediately. Similarly, the notion of bilateral cooperation between
Russia and the United States on missile surveillance could include joint
military-air-traffic control. That seems categorically unacceptable if the
dominant purpose is to prepare for imminent war. It is desirable, however, if
the dominant purpose is to reassure others that war is not imminent and
cannot be rapidly prepared.
If reassurance were to be the guiding spirit, as it largely is among the
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members of the U.S. alliance system, then a great deal of operational infor-
mation currently considered sensitive presumably would be shared among
those accepting the terms of exchange. That could include budget projec-
tions, investment plans, training schedules, and deployment exercises. Un-
doubtedly, there would still be prudent limits to such exchanges, but in a
renovated arrangement, those limits would be much narrower than under
current practice.
In the latter stages of the Cold War, the stabilizing effect of voluntarily
disclosed information came to be recognized, and a number of confidence-
building measures were formally introduced. In the aftermath of the Cold
War, it is important to extend that tradition and upgrade its priority. Since it
is unlikely that equitable force balances can be established anytime soon, it
is all the more important that the idea of confidence and the underlying
principle of reassurance be elevated from subordinate status to the main pri-
ority. That is how arms control should be renovated.
Notes
1. It is generally accepted that weapons tests with nuclear explosive yields of ten tons
TNT equivalent up to a few hundred tons might evade reliable verification. Not
even the United States, with the most extensive store of test data at its disposal,
would rely on tests in that range for the design of weapons in the much higher yield
ranges used for the deterrent forces. All other countries would be very substantially
less able to do so. Moreover, the enhanced verification provisions that would be en-
abled by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would make it increasingly
difficult to conduct a test series in the very low range of uncertainty without even-
tually being detected.
2. See Sidney Drell, The JASON’S Report on Nuclear Testing: Summary and Conclu-
sions, August 1, 1995, available at http://www.stimson.org/rd-table/jasons.htm.
